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ON GOD AND NECESSITY
Brian Leftow

My God and Necessity offers a theist a theory of modal truth. Two recent articles
criticize the theory’s motivation and main features. I reply to these criticisms.

Theists have long thought about the relation between God and necessary truth. The dominant tradition has offered what I call deity theories,
holding that God’s nature makes necessary truths true or gives rise to
their truthmakers—that the content of God’s nature, deity, is the ultimate
reason that 2 + 2 = 4 or that hydrogen atoms have one proton. My God and
Necessity argues that theists should consider a non-deity approach and
develops one.1 Chris Tweedt has in this journal questioned my motivating
arguments against the deity view; in the first part of this response I defend
those arguments. I begin with a bit about motivation, then recap some of
my arguments against deity theories and discuss Tweedt’s countermoves.
William Craig’s review of my book (also in this journal) raises a number
of questions about my non-deity proposal; the last parts of this response
answer Craig’s objections.
Why Care?
One might wonder why anyone should care about the relation between
God and necessary truth. Pastors picking up the phone at midnight rarely
hear an anguished, “but what about mathematics?” Well, my animating
thought is one at the core of Western theism: that God is the sole ultimate
reality. I take this to imply inter alia that everything else—absolutely everything else—in the ontological census is there because God put it there,2
and whatever states of affairs do not trace to created free agency or the
random action of created probabilistic causes, trace back to God somehow.
This (I argue) includes even necessary states of affairs. The bulk of my
book tries to show how best to explicate this.
Why a Deity Theory?
The dominant theist view, as noted above, has been that God’s nature is the
ultimate reason necessary truths are true and necessary. This is a natural
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Henceforth GN.
Parsing is needed to avoid a limited form of occasionalism here. Consider it done.
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thought. If a truth is necessary, it’s natural to seek a necessarily available
ground for it. God exists necessarily and necessarily has His nature. Plausibly nothing else about God is necessary—everything necessary in God is
His existence or an aspect of His nature. To classical and medieval authors,
this was plausible due to a commitment to divine simplicity, which was
usually taken to imply that there was nothing to God but His nature.3 To
us this is plausible because we’ve learned to explicate nature and essence
as e.g., the conjunction of all attributes an item has necessarily.4
What Is the Alternative?
There are other ways to think about the divine essence. Kit Fine suggests
that being necessary is not sufficient for being essential.5 Fine suggests
that while it is necessary to Socrates to belong to {Socrates}, it is not essential to him. It is not tied to his identity in the right way.6 Aristotelians
would say that it is necessary but not essential to me to have a sense of
humor: a sense of humor does not make me who or what I am. Suppose
we say that deity is just the property that makes God divine, that makes
Him who or what He is. Then plausibly deity is not all there is to God:
God has chosen to make you, but surely it does not make Him who or
what He is to have chosen this. Further, on a Finer-grained approach to
deity, there is room for the thought that some things in God are necessary
but not part of deity, and for contentful stories about how they get to be
necessary. We are free to look outside deity for a necessary ground in God
for at least some necessary truth.
An Argument against Deity Theories
I think we should, for I am not sure that deity more narrowly understood
can really ground all necessary truth. It seems to me that deity has just one
ontological job. Just as having redness makes one red and having doghood makes one a dog, having deity makes one divine.7 Just as redness’s
only job is making red, deity’s only job is making divine. So (I submit) if
one has deity, that makes true of one just things that help make one divine.
Now on a deity theory, deity provides a truthmaker for every necessary
truth, and so for < water = H2O >.8 So on a deity theory, water’s being H2O
is part of deity’s content. But in fact, I submit, it is not. Water’s being H2O
doesn’t help make one divine. It doesn’t help make God what or who He

See e.g., Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia, 3.
For background, see Kit Fine, “Essence and Modality,” Philosophical Perspectives 8 (1994),
1–16.
5
Fine, “Essence and Modality.”
6
Ibid.
7
By making one divine, it makes one God, or so I argue: as I see it, deity is an individual
essence (GN, 206–208). That does not matter for present purposes.
8
Here I introduce a convention: “< P >” names the proposition that P.
3
4
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is. So (I conclude) < water = H2O > is not something having deity makes
true: strike one against deity theories.
Tweedt writes against this that
the description of deity that contains only what is necessary for making God
divine is general enough to exclude . . . the truths it truthmakes. In giving an
account of deity, we could even say “Deity truthmakes all necessary truths,”
without mentioning [specific truths]. This generality nevertheless entails
that deity requires certain necessary truths like [< water = H2O >]. Similarly,
in our account of what is necessary to make God divine, we could say “God
knows all truths” without mentioning [< water = H2O >], . . . and this too . . .
guarantees that deity requires certain necessary truths like [< water = H2O >].
. . . If an account of deity theory were to include specifics about everything
that makes God divine, the truthmaker for . . . every . . . necessary truth
would be given in this account.9

The truthmaker for < water = H2O > is water’s being H2O. So all this seems
just bald denial of one of my premises. Tweedt just asserts without argument that if we but knew it, water’s being H2O helps make God divine.
And what he says to flesh the denial out has problems.
There are two broad ways to parse < God knows all truths >, and neither
does for Tweedt what he wants it to. One parsing specifies a domain for
“all,” or at least commits us to a particular domain too large for us to
specify. This way brings each individual truth into the content of < God
knows all truths >. That God knows all truths, so understood—that He
knows all these truths—is contingent if there are any contingent truths.
For if there are, it is contingent that “all” has the particular domain it
does: it is contingent that God knows all these. But it is not contingent
that God is divine. Again, if knowing all these truths were part of what
makes someone divine, then necessarily, if there is a divine being, it knows
just these truths—and so there is no possible world in which there is a
divine being and you had a different egg for breakfast today. Surely that’s
false. So knowing all truths, understood as knowing all of just these, is
not included in deity. It is at best a contingent realizer of part of deity, and
knowing all necessary truths is at best necessarily part of any such realizer.
Another way to parse < God knows all truths > does not specify a domain or commit to a specific domain. Knowing all truths in this sense goes
into being divine: it is part of being divine to know all truths, whatever the
domain of “all” turns out to be. It does not thereby go into being divine
that anything in particular be true, as no particular truth is built into the
content of “all truths.” This applies even to necessary truths.10
9
Chris Tweedt, “Splitting the Horns of Euthyphro’s Modal Relative,” Faith and Philosophy
30 (2013) (henceforth “Tweedt”), 211–212.
10
Counter-argument: parsed the second way, < God knows all truths > has a disjunction
of domains. It is essential to God to know all truths, in the sense that it is essential to Him
to know either all propositions true in possible world W1, or all those true in W2, or . . . But
then by supervaluation over the possible domains, it is part of His essence to know all necessary truths. Reply: distinguish the modal from the Finer-grained senses of “essence” and
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Thus, knowing all truths does not provide a way being divine “requires”
that water = H2O. Further, were we to read the claim that deity truthmakes
all necessary truths in parallel with the way knowing all truths goes into
being divine, here too there would be no way being divine “required” that
water = H2O. That can’t be right. Truthmakers’ existing does “require” that
specific truths be true. That is the whole point of them. Further, the omniscience analogy, parsed this way, suggests that though it is part of being
divine to be the primary truthmaker for whatever the necessary truths
happen to be, deity does not include what those truths are or determine
this out of its own resources. If deity does not settle the content of necessary truth by itself, from its own resources, it is settled from outside deity.
That is just incompatible with a deity theory.
Tweedt might want to suggest that only the “generalities” about deity
are deifying—that the truthmakers for every specific necessary truth are
in deity, but are not part of what makes God divine. If this is so, deity has
more intrinsic content than the way a thing is in virtue of being divine (the
divine-making properties) and what is true of deity as entity (e.g., that it is
a property). This would make deity unique among properties. The intrinsic
content of a particular shade of red, for instance, is just what it is to be that
shade and that it is a color-property (etc.). Why should deity be different?
Alternately, Tweedt might be denying that deity gives God everything
necessary for being divine—saying that being divine “requires,” but does
not include, making it true that water = H2O, perhaps as being triangular
“requires” but does not include being trilateral. But being triangular does
“deity.” Taking “essence” merely as the conjunction of God’s necessary properties, the reply
is trivially correct, at least if you believe in supervaluation. But this does not suffice to show
that knowing these truths is part of what makes God divine, i.e., part of God’s Fine-grained
essence, deity. For there is an alternative it does not rule out—that it is part of God’s Finegrained essence to know whatever propositions turn out to be true, but something in God
other than His deity determines which propositions are necessarily true. On this alternative,
that God knows that water = H2O traces partly to deity and partly to something else in God.
And on this alternative, this something else could have the degree of freedom about what
turns out to be necessary that my view ascribes to it—on which see below.
Tweedt could have appealed instead to omnipotence. He could have suggested that it
is Fine-essential to God to be omnipotent, and that while we do broad-brush the content of
omnipotence by saying “God can do all things,” we flesh this out with e.g., “God can at t
bring about all states of affairs it is broad-logically possible to bring about at t,” and could
add further flesh by specifying all the states of affairs God can bring about. We might then
say: God is omnipotent and has the power to make only water that is H2O. He would not be
omnipotent were there any other sort of water that He could not make. So His natural omnipotence is the ground of the truth that water = H2O and its necessity, and in this way, that
water = H2O is part of His nature, present there to make it true that water = H2O. I would have
replied in the same way, though: it is Fine-essential to God to be able to bring about whatever
can be brought about. But fleshed-out omnipotence is not Fine-essential to God, and perhaps
not essential at all. I would argue that it is not Fine-essential to God that there are any times.
Even aside from this, what can be brought about at t does not depend entirely on God’s Fineessence. I do not think God can change the past. If He cannot, there are things that can be
brought about at earlier times that broad-logically cannot be brought about at later times: it is
broad-logically impossible now that anyone, even God, bring it about that the Poles defeated
the Germans in 1939, though God could have brought this about in 1939. Here again we have
just a realizer, and the rest of my story goes as with omniscience.
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give a triangle everything “required” for being a triangle. Though it can be
nominally defined without mentioning trilaterality, trilateral is part of the
way a thing is in virtue of being triangular. Being human does give me everything “required” for being human. Though it can be nominally defined
without mentioning that I am three-dimensional, three-dimensional is
part of the way a thing is in virtue of being human. So if Tweedt means to
deny that deity gives God everything needed to be divine, this too would
make deity unique among properties. Tweedt gives no reason we should
expect deity to be unique in either way.
Another Argument against Deity Theories
Consider the claim that
1. if (it is untrue that water = H2O ) → then God does not exist.
(1) is true simply because it has an impossible antecedent. We are sure of
this because the antecedent’s impossibility suffices to explain (1)’s truth
and (1)’s antecedent appears irrelevant to its consequent. (If water goes
down, why should it take God with it?) Thus (1) is true trivially, as are all
impossible-antecedent strict conditionals, but only trivially. But suppose
that a deity theory is true. Then if God exists, deity provides a truthmaker
for < water = H2O >. If < water = H2O > has a truthmaker, it is true. So on a
deity theory, if God exists, < water = H2O > is true. So on a deity theory, if it
is untrue that water = H2O, God does not exist. Thus on a deity theory, (1)
reflects a fact about the divine nature (that deity provides a truthmaker for
< water = H2O >). So (1)’s truth is overdetermined. Unintuitively, it is true
for substantive as well as trivial reasons. Further, a truth-to-truthmaker
connection provides a hidden link between (1)’s antecedent and consequent. Unintuitively, (1)’s antecedent is relevant to its consequent. Strike
two against deity theories.11
Tweedt’s Analogies
Tweedt uses two analogies to contest this argument. Tweedt’s first analogy
asks us to consider the Proposition Theory of Meaning, the theory that a
sentence is meaningful iff it expresses a proposition.12 Tweedt argues for
what I’ll call a metaphysical and an epistemic claim. The metaphysical
claim is that if the Proposition Theory were true, the meaningfulness of
apparently unconnected sentences would in fact be connected, just as if a
deity theory were true, the truth of apparently unconnected truths would
be connected.13 Equivalently, just as a deity theory makes (1) a substantive
truth, the Proposition Theory makes e.g.
2. if “water is H2O” is meaningless → “7 is prime” is meaningless
So GN, chap. 8.
Tweedt, 209–211.
13
Ibid., 209.
11
12
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a substantive truth. Tweedt’s epistemic claim is that (2)’s antecedent and
consequent “should seem connected” to someone “not ignorant of” the
Proposition Theory.14 So too, Tweedt then suggests, someone “not ignorant of” deity theories should see (1)’s antecedent and consequent as
connected. The metaphysical claim is there to support the epistemic claim:
it’s because the theory connects antecedent and consequent that these
“should seem connected” to someone “not ignorant of” the theory.
I shortly argue that Tweedt does not manage to support his metaphysical claim, and that his epistemic claim is likely false. But I first make
a more basic point: Tweedt is going for the wrong sort of conclusion.
My argument was against accepting a theory. Suppose that if one adds
a theory to one’s background beliefs (or at least the hypotheses one is
“not ignorant of”), this should alter one’s impressions of which truths are
connected. How does that bear on whether one should accept the theory?
False background beliefs (or entertained hypotheses) can contribute to
misleading impressions. The only way to judge whether the impression is
misleading is to assess the evidence for and against the theory, not to consider whether the theory “should” make one see the world a certain way.
What Tweedt should have argued is that independent of a deity theory, we
do or should see (1) as non-trivial or not a paradox of strict implication, or
that we do see (1) as I say but this doesn’t really support my conclusion,
or that we do see (1) as I say and this does support my conclusion, but
other, stronger intuitions should overrule this.
Tweedt’s First Analogy: Metaphysical Claim
That said, I now turn Tweedt’s case. His argument for his metaphysical
claim is this15:
3. “Water is H2O” is meaningful iff it expresses some proposition. (by
Proposition Theory)
4. “7 is prime” is meaningful iff it expresses some proposition. (by
Proposition Theory)
5. If anything expresses a proposition, “water is H2O” does. (premise)
6. “Water is H2O” is meaningless. (premise for conditional proof)
7. “Water is H2O” does not express a proposition. (3, 6)
8. No sentence expresses a proposition. (5, 7)
9. “7 is prime” does not express a proposition. (8, UI)
10. “7 is prime” is meaningless. (4, 9)
11. “Water is H2O” is meaningless → “7 is prime” is meaningless. (6–10,
CP)
14
15

Ibid., 210.
Ibid., 209–210.
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That is, given the Proposition Theory and (5), (2) follows. As the theory
and (5) are substantive, were the Proposition Theory true, Tweedt concludes, it would “show” that (2) is substantive and true, counter to initial
intuition.16
I find (5) problematic. Tweedt takes (5) as “the analogue of”
< □(water = H2O) >.17 He does so because he expresses < □(water = H2O) > by
the sentence
S. If anything has a truthmaker, < water = H2O > has a truthmaker.18
Now Tweedt does not say what kind of conditional (S) is supposed to
express. To get necessity into its content, we must take (S) to express
12. Something has a truthmaker → < water = H2O > has a truthmaker.
A mere material conditional won’t do. So if it is to parallel (S), “if anything
expresses a proposition, ‘water = H2O’ does” must express
13. Something expresses a proposition → “water = H2O” does.
But (13) is false. There are worlds in which languages express propositions, but “water = H2O” is not a well-formed string of any language. If
(13) is false and is the right rendering of (5), Tweedt’s argument is unsound. If instead of (13) one offers
13a. Something expresses a proposition → “water = H2O” does,
not only do we lose the analogy to < □(water = H2O) >, but Tweedt’s argument to (2) won’t yield a strict conditional. But (2) is a strict conditional. So
if it includes (13a), the argument to (2) is invalid.
Does the problem with (13) matter? Here is an argument that it doesn’t.
(2) is false. In some possible worlds, “water is H2O” is a sentence of a
language and “7 is prime” is not. Since (2) is a strict implication, given S5,
(2) is in fact necessarily false. The truth of the Proposition Theory could
not alter this. So the analogy has to be read roughly this way: assume that
the Proposition Theory is true. Then follow it where it leads. It then turns
out that (2)’s antecedent does imply its consequent, due to the Proposition Theory, and so the two are substantively connected, by the assumed
truth of the Proposition Theory. So if we accept a model in which both (2)
and the Proposition Theory are true, it will emerge that the Proposition
Theory provides a substantive explanation of (2)’s truth.19 You might say:
we might as well add that in the model, (13) is true. We’re already dealing
in impossibilities. One more won’t hurt.

Ibid.
Ibid., 209.
18
Ibid., 210.
19
Here I’m indebted to correspondence with Tweedt.
16
17
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However, the argument for (2) is a conditional proof: it tries to show
(2) by assuming (2)’s antecedent and deriving (2)’s consequent. For a
conditional proof to be sound, the premises it invokes other than the
conditional’s antecedent must be true. Because it is a conditional proof
about consequences of the Proposition Theory, we can take the Proposition Theory as one more “assumed” part of the proof. But the argument
is not sound unless the rest of the premises are true. (13) is not. So the
conditional proof is unsound. So it does not in fact derive the conditional:
Tweedt does not show that the Proposition Theory gets us to (2).
Again, Tweedt needs an argument from (2)’s antecedent to its consequent whose premises are just (2)’s antecedent and the Proposition Theory.
The Proposition Theory is what links (2)’s antecedent to its consequent
only if the Proposition Theory plus (2)’s antecedent imply (2)’s consequent.
No implication, no link, so no substantive link. Tweedt shows that the conjunction (“water is H2O” is meaningless . Proposition Theory . (13)) yields
that “7 is prime” is meaningless. This would entail that (“water is H2O” is
meaningless . Proposition Theory) implies that “7 is prime” is meaningless
only if (13) were a thesis or a consequence of the Proposition Theory or a
necessary truth. (P implies Q just if P in conjunction with a necessary truth
implies Q.) (13) is none of these. So Tweedt does not have an argument
from (2)’s antecedent plus the Proposition Theory to (2)’s consequent. So
his reasoning is insufficient to back the metaphysical claim, particularly as
it remains a live option that (13) is what really generates the antecedentconsequent connection, or at least is a substantive necessary condition of
there being one.
Tweedt’s First Analogy: Epistemic Claim
This matters to Tweedt’s epistemic claim. If the Proposition Theory does
not create a substantive connection between < “water is H2O” is meaningless > and < “7 is prime” is meaningless >, even in the model, it can’t be true
that someone believing the theory and the model “should” see one. The
most such a person “should” see is a connection between (Proposition
Theory . (13)) and there being a substantive connection. John has looked
at Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit, seen a duck, and never even considered
whether there is also a rabbit in the picture. Jane suggests that there may
be. Now that John is “not ignorant of” this possibility (Tweedt’s phrase),
he may look and see one too; in fact he “should” see one, because it is
there.20 There is no rabbit in a face-on portrait of Daffy Duck. A rabbittheory of Daffy Duck could not create one. So even if Jane suggests this to
John, John should not see one there. So if Tweedt cannot show his metaphysical claim, he cannot show his epistemic claim either.

20

The illustration is Tweedt’s, in correspondence.
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Tweedt’s Second Analogy
Tweedt’s other proposed analogy invokes the “possibility axiom,” the claim
that p is possible iff p is true at some possible world. He wants to use it to
establish the . . . prima facie unconnected conditional:
14. If it is not possible that 7 is prime, then it is not possible that President
Obama is in China.
By the possibility axiom, it is possible that 7 is prime if and only if [at] some
possible world . . . < 7 is prime >. . . . Further, it is possible that President
Obama is in China if and only if [at] some possible world . . . < President
Obama is in China >. . . . Let’s assume it is not possible that 7 is prime.

Further, let’s assume:

A. if anything is true at a possible world, < 7 is prime > is.
It follows that nothing is true at any possible world. If [so], then < President
Obama is in China > is not true at a possible world. So it is not possible that
President Obama is in China. . . . [T]he possibility that 7 is prime seems
prima facie unconnected to the possibility that President Obama is in China
only if we are ignorant of the possibility axiom.21

Now when a deity theory creates a substantive connection that links (1)’s
antecedent and consequent, we can say of what sort that is: truth-to-truthmaker. We can say why the theory alone makes the connection substantive:
because it makes deity (or God’s having deity, or etc.) a truthmaker for
< water = H2O >. This is why it seems that if the theory is true, what makes
the theory true is what creates the substantive connection. However, even
given the “axiom,” I do not see of what sort the substantive link between
(14)’s antecedent and its consequent is supposed to be. (Tweedt’s first
analogy has the same problem.) Further, it is not the “axiom” that makes
the connection (supposedly) substantive. If we remove the “axiom” and
adjust (A) accordingly, we get:
Assume it is not possible that 7 is prime.
Further, assume: if anything is possible, < 7 is prime > is.
It follows that nothing is possible.
If nothing is possible, then < President Obama is in China > is not possible.
This works as well or badly as Tweedt’s argument. The “axiom” thus
looks like a non-load-bearing wall; if we knock it out, the structure still
stands. If it is non-load-bearing, it is not what bears the load of there being
a substantive connection. It is not what creates one, if there is one. Further,
given S5, there is an analogue of (A) for any possibly true proposition. So
21
Ibid. “14” and “A” are not in Tweedt’s original; I have inserted them to smooth discussion.
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if Tweedt’s metaphysical claim about the “axiom” and (14) is true, it is for
parallel reasons true that S5 creates a substantive connection between the
antecedent and consequent of all (14)-like conditionals. I believe that S5 is
the correct logic for metaphysical modality, and I see no reason to believe
in these connections, let alone that S5 somehow creates them. If they are
not there, Tweedt’s metaphysical claim about the “axiom” is false.
Against the Epistemic Claim
Tweedt’s analogies do not yield his metaphysical claim. But even if they
worked, they would not yield his epistemic claim, i.e., show that if we
accept the Proposition Theory or a deity theory, we “should” see a connection between (2)’s or (1)’s antecedent and consequent. I have said that
a deity theory does not in fact make us see one, and lacks the claim on our
acceptance that a well-confirmed background scientific theory has.22 My
point was this. Suppose that a scientific theory for which there is independent evidence yields a conditional whose antecedent seems irrelevant
to its consequent. Due to the irrelevance, the conditional seems unintuitive and implausible—unlikely to be true. But the evidence for the theory
gives us reason to overrule our impression that the conditional should not
be true. The conditional considered in itself seems no more plausible. The
antecedent does not seem more relevant to the consequent. The theory
does not change how they seem to us, initially and prima facie, considered
in themselves. But the evidence on behalf of the theory that yields the
conditional is sufficient reason to overlook how they seem to us. There is
(I claimed) no such evidence on behalf of a deity theory. There is nothing
to make us overrule our impression. That a deity theory implies that (1)’s
antecedent and consequent have a hidden substantive connection thus
remains just a strike against the theory.23
If I were a deity theorist, I would continue to find the claim that there
is a substantive connection between (1)’s antecedent and consequent surprising and unintuitive. I would simply think I had reason to overlook
this. I might say to myself, “of course that’s so, given the theory.” I would
not say to myself, “of course that’s so.” That I accept an explanation of
something initially implausible, and so apparently unlikely, on which it
does not count as unlikely, does not change the fact that considered in
itself, apart from the explanation, it appears or is unlikely. Let’s say that
I’m a first-century atheist. I meet a remarkable preacher. Later I watch
him die, crucified. A few days after that, we meet and converse. It would
explain this well that there is a God and the one I’m speaking to is the
Messiah. I thus become a theist. I accept an explanation for the resurrection. But it does not cease to be unlikely considered in itself that a man
rose from the dead. Nor “should” it. That Q is probable conditional on P
has no bearing on how probable Q is or seems apart from P. Tweedt may
22
23

GN, 238.
Thus Tweedt misreads me at 207.
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think that if one comes to accept a deity theory, one “should” view (1)
only in light of that theory and so “should” come to see it simply as unsurprising, as plausible. That would be like saying that Christians should
not find it surprising that a man rose from the dead—that though it was
a miracle and almost entirely unprecedented, Christians should not appreciate these facts about it.
I take it, then, that my arguments for considering an alternative to deity
theories are unscathed.24 I now briefly state my alternate view and take up
Craig’s discussion of it.
The View
Suppose that, as my arguments suggest, not all necessary truths are
written into the nature of God. Say that it is not part of deity for water to
be H2O, or for there to be such a property as being water. If not, then either
there is such a property independent of God—which I reject—or water
must be something God dreamed up, something God simply invented, uncompelled and unconstrained by anything. As I see it, God is so radically
creative that He not merely created water ex nihilo, He thought up water ex
nihilo. God creatively thought up the very natures of candidate creatures,
and the states of affairs in which they figure. Our creativity can add only
to the concrete and to history. We think we have genuinely new ideas, but
even if they do not just rearrange particulars and attributes met in experience, God had them first. At the origin of all things, God (I claim) really did
have completely new ideas, not prefigured in His nature. Further, having
24
I give one more argument. Tweedt misreads it—the referee’s rendering at 208n12 is
closer—and so I will not state or discuss it.
The argument from (1) is subject to a (to me) more worrying counter than Tweedt’s.
On my view, something necessary in God is the primary truthmaker for < water = H2O >.
The counter is that one can substitute “something necessary in God” for “deity” in the
argument from (1) and get a pretty good parallel to the argument against deity theories. It
runs as follows: intuitively, (1) is only trivially true. But on my view, if God exists, something necessary in God provides a truthmaker for < water = H2O >. If < water = H2O > has a
truthmaker, it is true. So on my view, if God exists, < water = H2O > is true. So on my view if
it is untrue that water = H2O, God does not exist. Thus on my view, (1) reflects a fact about
God (that something necessary in God provides a truthmaker for < water = H2O >). So (1)’s
truth is overdetermined, substantive as well as trivial, and (1)’s antecedent is relevant to
its consequent. Strike one against my non-deity theory, and so (since there is a parallel
strike against deity theories) against all theist theories. For one way to respond to this,
see GN, 241–242. I now briefly gesture at another: even though that in God which makes
it true is necessarily there, in my technical sense of “in God,” it is in God not to have
it there, for it is in God never to have thought up water at all. (For this technical sense
see GN, 252–253; for a better explanation than GN’s, see my “Reply to Bohn,” European
Journal of Philosophy of Religion 6, no. 3 (2014), 49–57.) Thus it is in God to exist even if it is
untrue that water = H2O. This is enough to render (1) trivial—trivial because true only due
to the semantics of conditionals rather than reflecting the way the facts about what it is in
God to have be the case negate any real dependence of God’s existence on water’s being
H2O. For allied reasons, (1)’s antecedent is not relevant to its consequent. While the prime
truthmaker for < water = H2O > is something necessarily in God, it is not something God’s
existence depends on (unlike deity). So it is not something whose lack could in any way
explain God’s non-existence, and so its lack would not be a relevant factor to appeal to were
we trying to explain that.
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thought up “secular” states of affairs—those that in no way involve God,
distinctively divine attributes, etc.—it was up to Him what their modal
status would be.
Now powers are things that can bring about effects. If a power can bring
a state of affairs about, the state of affairs can obtain: it is possible. Power
implies possibility. So “before” God thought up dogs, “before” dogs were
possible, He had a general power to create, but not a specific power to
create dogs.25 If God then makes it possible that there be dogs, He also
gives Himself a specific power to make dogs.26 Or rather, say I, God empowers Himself to make dogs, and by so doing makes them possible.27
However, as I see it, God’s creativity does not extend to logic, mathematics
or His own nature.28 On these I agree with the deity theorists.
Craig’s Critique
Craig writes that
if it is up to God . . . freely to assign . . . modal status . . . then God . . . was
able to . . . decide differently . . . and could have. . . . But on Leftow’s theory
. . . it is impossible that God have done . . . differently.29

Craig’s suppressed premise is that one acts freely at t only if at t it is possible that one do otherwise. Without this Craig cannot infer from freedom
in that act to alternate possibilities for that act. But even many libertarians have denied Craig’s premise—e.g., Robert Kane,30 Eleonore Stump,31
Laura Ekstrom32 and James Lamb.33 So it is not particularly outré to do so.
Again, Craig writes that
if it is up to God . . . freely to assign . . . modal status . . . then God . . . was
able to do so, had the power to do so, and could . . . But on Leftow’s theory
all that is false. God lacked the power to . . . make dogs possible.34

25
Read “before” here non-temporally, as relative to an order of explanation, or a purely
causal order, or an order of presupposition.
26
If He is to be omnipotent, then once dogs are possible, He must be able to make them.
27
Obviously, this broad picture has to be modified in various ways to deal with problemcases. GN spends a lot of time on that.
28
These are not secular: see GN, 251.
29
William Craig, review of God and Necessity, Faith and Philosophy 30 (2013) (henceforth
“Craig”), 466.
30
Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 39–43.
31
Eleonore Stump, “Libertarian Freedom and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities,”
in Faith, Freedom, and Rationality, ed. Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder (Lanham, MD:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1996); “Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities,” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1990).
32
Laura Ekstrom, Free Will (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), 211–213.
33
James Lamb, “Evaluative Compatibilism and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,”
Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993), 517–527.
34
Craig, 466.
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To treat the power to make dogs possible, I first discuss the power to think
dogs up, then the power to make them possible once they are in the divine
mind. I say that it is up to God to invent whatever secular states of affairs
there are. Craig suggests that if so, He had the power to do so. I agree,
in a way, but it matters just what that way is. My theory makes God the
author not just of created reality, but of its vocabulary of properties: He
makes up the very language in which He and we write history. There is
for most theist thinkers a correlation between God’s concepts and properties: as most hold that He exists and is omniscient necessarily, for most,
necessarily there is a property F iff God has a concept of F-hood. I say that
this correlation is due to a connection: God establishes what properties
there are by forming His concepts.35 In particular, God made up doghood.
Before thinking it up, God had a general power to conceive creatively ex
nihilo, that unique power by which He adds the truly new to the abstract
fabric of things—henceforth simply the power to conceive. Once doghood
exists, we can call this a power to conceive doghood, if we wish: it is the
power from which doghood came. But “before” God thought up doghood,
no-one, not even He, could have called it that. To call it that, one would
need the concept of doghood, and before He first formed that concept,
there was no such thing.
Because there was no such concept, at that point there could not be, in
addition to the general power to conceive, a specific power to conceive
doghood. A power to conceive doghood includes the concept of doghood
or doghood itself in its makeup, and so an ingredient was lacking. In fact,
there could not at any point be a specific power to conceive doghood creatively ex nihilo. That power would include in its makeup, prior to its use,
the doghood only its use is supposed to account for. If a specific power to
conceive doghood exists, doghood or the concept of doghood is already
there, and so that power’s use cannot account ex nihilo for there being
either. But that is what a specific power to conceive doghood ex nihilo
would do. So the power’s mere being there would prevent the power from
bringing about what it is supposedly a power to bring about: it would be
a necessarily self-blocking power. There is no such thing.
There could not be a specific power to conceive doghood creatively ex
nihilo. But it doesn’t follow that God had no power to do so. It doesn’t take
a specific power with doghood in its makeup to do this. Rather, God had
the only power needed: the power to conceive creatively. It just is the nature of creativity to add something new to reality, and of perfect creativity
to add something completely new. If we ask why His use of that power
yielded doghood, if it was not a specific power to conceive doghood, the
answer is: it just did. God just did think doghood up. Explanation stops
here, at an undetermined use of His power to add something completely
35
In fact, I reduce properties to divine concepts, and then eliminate divine concepts. But
that’s a long story not needed here; I talk about properties, concepts and “abstract reality”
to ease exposition.
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new to abstract reality, just as the explanation of concrete created reality
stops ultimately at God’s undetermined use of His power to choose (and
so add something completely new to concrete reality).
Once God has doghood in mind, it is then up to Him whether it is to
be possible. I treat the power to make dogs possible as I treat the power to
conceive them. “Before” God thought up dogs, there could not be such a
power. There were just the general powers God would use to make anything possible: His powers to conceive, to permit Himself to do things and
to specify His general powers (e.g., to create) by thinking up creatures and
permitting Himself to make them (thus yielding e.g. a specific power to
make dogs). Once God had doghood in mind, He had the power to make it
possible. For dogs did not run afoul of His natural biases against the contralogical and -mathematical and the too-bad-to-permit (of which more anon),
and so one thing He then had a specific, particular, all-things-considered
power to do was to permit Himself to make dogs.36 If He did permit this,
that would give Him the all-things-considered power to make dogs. The
existence of this power would make dogs possible. So once God thought
up dogs, He had the power to make them possible. As with thinking dogs
up, we can retrospectively (so to speak) call the general powers God had
ab initio powers to make dogs possible, because they are the powers from
which the possibility of dogs came.37 Craig asks whether God
can . . . prior to thinking up secular states of affairs, will to have the power
to create dogs? . . . no, for [at that point] there is no such thing as doghood.
Therefore, God at that moment is unable to will to have the power to create
dogs. But [then] how does God manage to acquire that power?38

The answer is this: first God creatively thinks up doghood. At that point,
with the equipment in hand, He can will to have the power to create dogs.
He can consider the idea of doghood, decide that He likes it enough to
permit dogs to exist, and give Himself the power to make them.
The S5 Dilemma
Craig also tries to add force to a problem I raise myself. In a nutshell: as
I see it, God determines which secular states of affairs are to be possible.
His preferences guide this. I argue that He could have had different preferences. I also argue that He could not have determined different secular
states of affairs to be possible.39 It is impossible that there be other “broadly
36
A power is all-things-considered just if all one has to do to use it is try to do so. A
power fails to be all-things-considered if there are circumstances that would prevent one
from using it if one tried. At the moment, I have an all-things-considered power to type. If
I were chained to a wall, out of reach of my keyboard, I would have an intrinsic but not an
all-things-considered power to type.
37
I’m eliding a long story here.
38
Craig, 467.
39
In setting up the problem, Craig writes that for me “God was able to create something
that is impossible” (468n8). He means only, I think, that for me God had the power to have
something impossible come out possible instead, and that had it been possible, God would
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logical” possibilities; as I see it, the right logic for broadly logical modality
is S5, and I show that this result emerges naturally from my views. So for
me, God necessarily makes the choices about possibility that He actually
makes. So here is a problem I raise myself: on my view, other preferences
are possible, preferences guide choices, but other choices about possibility
are not possible—and these claims appear to be in tension.40 Craig suggests that
Even were it true that if God had different preferences, He would choose the
same possibilities . . . God, as a libertarian agent, still could choose differently. So there seems to be a genuine inconsistency here. . . . [On the other
hand,] if we allow God’s preferences to constrain His choices too narrowly,
then Leftow’s theory is in danger of collapsing into a deity theory.41

Now being a libertarian agent requires at most possibly choosing otherwise on some occasion. One need not always have an alternate possibility
to be a libertarian agent. The blessed in heaven are libertarian agents if
they ever were, even if they can no longer choose to reject God; God is
a libertarian agent in keeping a promise if He ever is one, even if He is
not able to break the promise. So there is no inconsistency: an agent can
be libertarian and yet in some situations or in some choices not possibly
choose otherwise.42 Further, if God does not possibly choose otherwise,
it does not follow that the preferences that lead to this result are dictated
by what it is to be divine, and so it will take showing that there is a real
danger of deity theory.
Still, there is a tight spot for me here, though Craig does not raise it
well. What Craig wants to foreground, I think, is this: just how much
does God’s nature constrain what He prefers to have possible? If God’s
nature constrains His preferences entirely, i.e., determines them, we have
an explanation for the S5 result. As His nature cannot differ, neither can
His preferences. But then, as Craig suggests, we’ve collapsed into a deity
theory. On the other hand, the less God’s nature constrains His preferences,
have been able to create it. On my view it is never the case both that some state of affairs is
impossible and that God can bring it about.
40
GN, 406–407; the text here is a cleaner formulation.
41
Craig, 468.
42
I say that in the permitting which establishes secular modal facts, God is free “either in
the strongest libertarian sense or in a strong analogue to this” (GN, 461). I cash this in with
a claim that He is wholly undetermined in His choice and has it in Him to do otherwise. But
on the technical sense I give “in Him,” this does not entail possibly doing otherwise. Craig
dislikes my technical sense: “Leftow’s conditional definition of what it is to be ‘in God’ is
equivalent to saying that God wills to have a particular power only if He has it. That seems
to get the explanatory priority wrong, which suggests that material implication is too weak
to serve the intended purpose here. The intention seems to be to make God’s willing to have
a particular power explanatorily prior to His having it: He has it because He willed it; He
doesn’t will it because He has it” (Craig, 467). But the conditional definition can equally be
read as I intended, as that God is intrinsically such that if He wills to have it, He has it. The
“if” version gets the priority right; the thought is that His nature is such that all He has to
do to have the power is will to have it. There is no reason to prefer Craig’s equivalent, and
charity rules against it.
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the more widely His preferences might vary. The more widely they might
vary, the harder it is to see why no matter what, they would lead God to
the same decisions about possibility. If God is wholly rational, then in an
unconstrained choice, as this one is, He follows His preferences. So it can
seem that God’s preferences might vary only if God’s choice about possibility might also vary. If that’s so, the mere fact that the preferences might
vary seems to defeat the S5 claim. So it seems that I can have either the S5
claim or the claim that God could have had different preferences, but not
both. I now take this up. I first discuss why God would have made the
same secular states of affairs possible no matter what His preferences, then
show how I avoid collapse into a deity theory.
The S5 Story
Here’s my story. It was up to God what secular states of affairs there are.
That is, it was His doing alone, subject to no external influence or internal
compulsion, even by His nature. That this was up to Him, in the sense
given, does not imply that this could have come out differently. For reasons I develop, there would have been the same secular states of affairs
no matter what. God’s dreaming these up is a stage in the explanation of
secular modal status prior to God’s preferring some to others, so there is
no issue about alternate preferences here.
States of affairs’ value-properties supervene on their non-value content.
So no matter what, they have the same value-properties.43 So no matter
what, God would have faced the same candidates for possibility, with the
same value-properties. By His nature (I say), He rules out of possibility
any that would be contra-logical or -mathematical. As to the rest, their
value-properties guide His choice. As these would be the same no matter
what, we’d get a different choice only if God’s all-things-considered preferences so differed as to generate one.
God is morally perfect by nature. His preferences cannot affect this. So
no matter what, He would have brought the same moral character to His
choice. God is also evaluatively perfect by nature: there are non-moral sorts
of value, and He perfectly appreciates differences in these. Again, this is
not something His preferences can affect. So by nature, He disallows any
state of affairs that is too bad objectively, i.e., any involving disvalue whose
43
At least, the same ones based purely on their intrinsic content. States of affairs stand in
different relations in different worlds, thus have different extrinsic properties, and so may
have different value-properties in different worlds based on these extrinsic properties. But
then they and the states of affairs to which they are related form larger wholes to which these
value properties are intrinsic, and these intrinsic value-properties, again, are the same in all
possible worlds. One might argue that every state of affairs is related in some way to every
other in a world (at least by co-obtaining), and so the only whole that has only value properties based on its purely intrinsic content is an entire possible world. Well, if so, still, a world
has the same value properties in all worlds in which it exists. And in any case, I doubt that all
relations in which states of affairs stand bring value or disvalue—co-obtaining being a prime
example. So even if there are relations between every state of affairs in a world and every
other, it may still be that small states of affairs are as if isolated from others, for the purpose
of considering their value properties.
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permission a perfectly good, evaluatively perfect God could not justify. A
God necessarily perfect morally and evaluatively who had charge over
the content of possible worlds would not let such disvalue be possible.
For He lets it be possible only if it is possible that such a world be actual,
i.e., only if it is possible that He permit this disvalue. If He is necessarily
morally and evaluatively perfect, it is not possible that He permit it. Thus
we have a third class of states of affairs God wouldn’t allow to be possible
no matter what. The only remaining question is whether His preferences
might contingently impose some further condition on possibility, beyond
those of logic, mathematics and objective badness.
I do not claim to know God’s full policy on permitting to be possible.
Craig takes it that on my view God finds some states of affairs evaluatively neutral and so “is indifferent as to their modal status.”44 A closer
reading of the relevant pages would have found me to be undecided about
whether any state of affairs is entirely neutral,45 to have argued that there
are no overall neutral possible worlds,46 to have suggested that if there are
intrinsically value-neutral non-divine portions of candidate worlds God
would have an attitude toward them rather than being indifferent,47 and
to have reasoned about how to treat absolutely neutral states of affairs “if
such there be.”48
Again, Craig suggests that for me it is “perfectly consistent with God’s
nature that He have decided that gold have a different atomic number.”49
This requires a bit of discussion. If atomic numbers are not essential properties, other atomic numbers are not a problem. If they are essential, this
ascribes to me something like Descartes’s notorious claim that God “was
free to make it not true that all the radii of the circle are equal.”50 But if
they are essential, they are either definitionally or non-definitionally essential: they either do or don’t figure in some truth of the form that to be
gold is to be F. Suppose that gold has a definitional essence, and its atomic
number is part of it: to be gold just is inter alia to have that atomic number.
Then contra Craig, I hold explicitly that it is not in God even to conceive
gold otherwise, let alone to decide this about it.51 Nothing He thought of
differently could count as gold: different definition, different definiendum.
For there is no pre-given property or concept whose definition God is
trying to get right. Rather, God’s definition determines what the property
Craig, 468.
GN, 374.
46
Ibid., 375.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid., 378.
49
Craig, 468.
50
Descartes to Mersenne, 3 June 1630, in Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of
Descartes, v. 3, trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, and A. Kenny (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 26.
51
GN, 419.
44
45
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or concept is. This is a case of divine stipulative definition: gold is simply
something God dreamed up.
Suppose on the other hand that gold’s atomic number is essential but
not definitionally essential. Then what I say is this.52 Perhaps something
with a different atomic number could have played just the role gold
plays in a history indiscernible from ours save for this substitution. If so,
perhaps that’s reason to say that gold could have had a different atomic
number. Note that on this alternative, God does not decide that anything
have a different essential property than it actually has. He merely decides
which sort of thing to plug into a role. This isn’t even a distinctively modal
decision; it’s one about what is to be actual. There is nothing paradoxical
or counter-intuitive about allowing God this sort of decision.
I also say that it is in God to have not had His actual representation
of gold, but have had instead some representation of an element differing in just one feature, one essential but not definitional to (say) gold
atoms. Suppose that He did this, and the different feature were the atomic
number. Then I explicitly take no stand on what we should say about it.
Influenced by the similarity between the concepts, we might say that He
had conceived gold differently—that this other concept is that of gold,
slightly altered. On the other hand, we might think that even a concept
which just specifies a list of essential properties for an element effectively
has a definition, which is the conjunction of those properties, or (if we
don’t think that) think that even a change in this non-definitional feature
is enough to imply that this is not the same concept altered. Thinking
this way, we might say that this would have been a different concept.
These other alternatives suppose that God has simply had a different set
of secular conceivings, which do not include His actual gold-concept.
Here God isn’t deciding anything about gold. He hasn’t had His actual
gold-concept; we are deciding what to say about this, and I make no recommendation. If you find it paradoxical to describe the situation as one
in which God conceives gold with a different atomic number, nothing in
my view forces you to describe it that way. I leave you free to say that I
simply allow that it is in God not to have thought up gold, but to have
thought up something else instead. Craig’s charge is just calumny. Add
to this that I hold that God’s nature determines logical and mathematical
truth and that states of affairs have goodness- and badness-properties by
their relation to His nature, not His will,53 and it is clear that my view is
not close to Descartes’s at all.
Again, I don’t claim to know how God decides what is to be possible. I
can’t and don’t rule it out that He has access to considerations unknown
to us, which make one unique selection of possibilities objectively best,

Ibid., 289–290.
For Descartes’s denial of the last, see his Sixth Replies, in Cottingham et al., Philosophical
Writings, v. 2, 291.
52
53
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providing a sufficient reason for His choice.54 If that’s how it is, His perfectly rational, perfectly good nature would zero in on that no matter
what. He would still be following preference in doing so. It would not be
a natural preference, because it would not have been part of His nature
that (say) it is uniquely best to have possibilities including that dogs exist.
His nature alone would not determine Him to prefer the possibility of
dogs, or completely explain this selection,55 because it would not have determined that there were dogs to prefer. The preference He follows would
be a preference determined by His nature in conjunction with content He
just dreams up.
If that’s how it is, the S5 result follows. God is by nature rationally,
morally and evaluatively perfect and a lover of all good. So no matter
what, God would have faced the same value-facts as bases for choice and
brought the same standards and relevant preferences to the choice: and so
no matter what, there would have been the same possibilities. That God
might have had different preferences doesn’t imply that His preferences
might have differed in all respects. I first introduce the possibility of different preferences to make sense of His choice among possibilities, not the
choice that establishes possibilities as possible.56 I’m committed to the possibility of the kind of difference that could explain the former, not of the
kind of difference that would create a problem about the latter.57
Still, while I don’t claim to know God’s policy, one suggestion I take
seriously is that God allows as possible any state of affairs that is not too
bad objectively.58 The thought behind that is roughly this: God is a perfect
lover of all good. God does as pleases Him, and objective goodness is what
pleases Him. Once He has ruled out all that is too bad to tolerate, what
remain are states of affairs objectively good enough for Him to permit.
It is good that it be possible that something good be actual. We are glad
to get lottery tickets as gifts because it is good that it be possible in the
relevant sense that we win: giving a lottery ticket gives a good possibility,
and a good possibility makes a good gift. God is not yet choosing what is
to be actual. He is making the prior decision of what is to be possible. So
it is open to Him to maximize the amount of this sort of good He has at
this point. There is no downside to doing so. This obviously would also
maximize the good involved in having a greater range of available good
options. So I cannot see why He would not. That suggests that He would
permit all that is not too bad to permit. Another line of reasoning tending
this way: a God who loves all good would permit whatever is good enough
GN, 465.
Ibid., 460.
56
Ibid., 267–271.
57
Still, if God’s mind is anything like ours, God consults His preferences at the point of His
first choice, which is about the possible. God’s preferences get a look-in because He decides
what to permit by what He approves of or likes.
58
GN, 492.
54
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to permit. After all, it is good enough to permit, and He loves the good in
it. It would be irrational to deprive Himself of the possibility of having
something He loves, in this circumstance: having it takes no effort and
imposes no cost on anyone else. That again suggests permitting all that
is not too bad objectively to tolerate. This would be one way for a unique
selection of possibilities to be objectively best.
If that’s how it goes, then again, the S5 result follows, since it is part
of God’s nature to be a perfect lover of all good. If that is not how it goes,
then there are states of affairs not too bad to permit which God does not
permit. God permits everything objectively valuable or pleasing overall to
at least degree n.59 (If He permits that P because its being the case that P is
overall good or pleasing to at least degree n, and that Q would also be at
least n good or pleasing, it would be irrational not also to permit Q.) But
there is a gap between n and what is too bad to permit, and God does not
permit what falls in the gap. Suppose this is so. Then the question is: could
the value of n differ? If it could not, then again, the S5 result follows. But
could it?
One might offer a Rowe-style argument against letting n differ: perhaps
if God could have had a higher standard, preferred a bigger gap between
n and the too-bad, He could have been more perfect. So if there is no world
in which He could have been more perfect, there is no world in which His
standard could have been higher, and if there is no world in which He
could have been less perfect, there is none in which His standard could
have been lower.60 I think this argument would be a wash, though; one
could reply that a higher standard would show a lack of sensitivity to the
genuine goodness in the low-value alternatives, and so a lower standard
would not clearly be a defect. It’s one thing if God actualizes a low value
alternative. That would need some explaining. It’s another for Him merely
to appreciate that there is enough goodness in it not to be ruled out of
consideration. As we’ve seen, some intuitions suggest that He should be
maximally accommodating at this level.
We’re discussing divine preferences, not divine free choices. So that
God is a libertarian agent has no bearing on this. Rather, we’re dealing
in likes, tastes, being pleased by: the sort of brute reaction to things that
in us is paradigmatically involuntary, emerging without choice or deliberation simply from our personality, attitudes and situation as they are
when we meet a new thing. Further, we’re talking about the eliciting of
God’s first non-natural preferences, and so no non-natural preferences
are brought to this. Rather, no matter what, there would be same natural
divine personality reacting to the same set of options, and that is all that
would determine what God likes. If there is an ideal reaction to have, then
59
There might of course be multiple, incommensurable hierarchies of value here, and perhaps no way to get a unique number to play the role I assign n here. All I’m doing is giving
a toy model. The extra complications one might bring in wouldn’t affect my overall point.
60
For Rowe’s original, see William Rowe, Can God Be Free? (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004).
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being necessarily perfect, He would necessarily have it, and so again we
have S5. But perhaps different reactions would be just different, not better
or worse.
We’re dealing with low-value candidate histories, and the thought that
God might or might not find them not good enough to allow even to be
possible. Our question is whether He might react in accord with different
standards about what is intolerable. “Intolerable” is a strong evaluative
reaction. The difference in value between just at the tolerability cutoff
and just below it may be infinitesimal, but the difference in attitude elicited seems large. Still, it need not be unwarranted. Surely some states of
affairs are too bad for God to tolerate. These differ only infinitesimally
from others not too bad. So if the difference in reaction is large, it can be
warranted to base this large a difference in reaction on this small a difference, because it is warranted to tolerate the tolerable and not tolerate
what is not.
The question, though, is whether this large a difference can be warranted if one looks at the same state of affairs, with the same personality,
in precisely the same situation. Would a perfectly rational, evaluatively
perfect agent look at a state of affairs in one world and say “intolerable!,”
and in another world, all other things being the same, say of it, “oh, OK,
then”? The difference between the two reactions would be utterly brute.
The greater the difference in reaction, the harder it is to view the difference
as rational, whether or not either judgment in itself is rationally defective.
Consider Inconstant Irving: if he meets Ravishing Rhonda on Monday he
will find it intolerable to live without her and launch a campaign to win
her hand, but if he meets her Tuesday in precisely the same circumstances,
neither having changed intrinsically save for being a day older, he won’t
find it intolerable: he’ll consider life without her, just say “oh, OK,” and
wander off. Perhaps it is not rationally defective either to be swept away
by or to be indifferent to Rhonda, but it points to something odd and arguably defective about Irving’s personality that he can differ so. There can be
nothing odd or defective about God’s personality.
That suggests that even if there is a gap between n and the too-bad, one
expressing something about God’s personality beyond His natural rejection of the too-bad, we wouldn’t get a brute world-to-world difference at
the level of choice about possibility. This reasoning doesn’t carry over to a
choice about actuality, though. For what decides between candidates for
actuality is not the difference between tolerable and intolerable, but (say)
that between being liked best and being liked infinitesimally less than the
best. Even an infinitesimal difference in liking from one world to the next
would suffice to explain a different creative choice, and there is nothing
irrational about an infinitesimal difference in liking, if one is the sort of
personality who can so differ.61
61
All this assumes that the difference in reaction between “intolerable” and “tolerable” is
large. But one might question this. The difference between feeling something to be intoler-
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But now the other horn of the dilemma looms. If I have the S5 result,
how do I avoid collapse into a deity theory, particularly if God’s nature
determines that He is a perfect lover of all good, evaluatively perfect, etc.?
Well, one option still on the table is that something in God not determined
by the content of deity dictates some gap between n and the too-bad. Just
as I can’t rule it out that His deity zeroes in on a unique objectively best
selection of possibilities, I can’t rule it out that something expresses itself
here which deity does not determine. But suppose that’s not so. Then we
still avoid a deity theory because God’s nature doesn’t contain a stock of
secular states of affairs or determine the stock of them He dreams up, in
reaction to which He forms all-things-considered preferences. The objection I lodge against deity theories, in a nutshell, is that it isn’t plausible
that God’s nature comes chock-full of creaturely natures. I don’t think that
if we could just peer far enough into God’s nature, we’d see zebras, orangutangs etc. God’s nature is not a zoo. All God’s lions were born free: in
God’s undetermined, unconstrained imagining. Perhaps His nature takes
over in determining the possible once they’re there. But even if that’s so,
the role I give God’s non-natural conceiving keeps me out of the deitytheoretic camp.
Craig is not right, then, that “Leftow’s view, like Cartesianism, has a
strong voluntaristic component.”62 On the contrary, the Preface’s first sentence says, “to locate my position, start at Aquinas and take a half-step
toward Descartes.”63 Aquinas is a paradigm deity theorist, and I meant
“half-step.” Though not a deity theory, the view is not very far from one,
and deity theorists could cheerfully accept a great deal of what I say in
developing it.
Craig also tries to find a problem in this:
Leftow holds that . . . since God could not have dreamed up different secular
states of affairs than He has, “God must have all and only the actual candidate histories in view.”64 This . . . seems incorrect. Take a physically possible
universe . . . God could have preferred that such a world be impossible, in
which case it is not one of the actual candidate histories.65

able and feeling it to be just barely tolerable with gritted teeth may also be infinitesimal.
These feelings determine our reactions. So some might suggest that the difference in reaction
from world to world is infinitesimal, but enough to make the difference about tolerability. I
reply that a tolerable state of affairs may differ only infinitesimally from an intolerable, and
one may dislike what one finds intolerable just infinitesimally more than one dislikes what
one tolerates with gritted teeth. What must be large is the difference between reactions in
a different dimension: what one judges when one judges something tolerable or judges it
intolerable. In moral contexts this just is the difference between being permissible and being
impermissible, and that is a very large difference indeed. But the moral difference is just the
instantiation in this domain of the more general difference, which one can also find between
e.g., the aesthetically tolerable (permissible) and intolerable (impermissible).
62
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I chose the phrase “candidate histories” with care. The histories in question have at the point at which I call them candidates no modal status at
all: they are candidates for possibility, not possible histories. Some make
the grade. Some don’t. It remains true even of those that don’t that they
are among the actual candidates for possibility—the ones actually considered—though they do not come out possible. It is also true on my view
that in every possible world, God selects among just those that actually
were candidates. Again, on my view, the correct logic of “broadly logical”
modality is S5. Were it the case that God could have preferred this history
impossible, there would be a possible world in which He did so. On my
view, if He so preferred things, that is how they would be. So there would
be a possible world in which it was impossible. Given S5, it would follow
that this history is impossible. The upshot is that on my view, if a universe
is physically possible, it is not the case that God could have preferred it to
be “broadly logically” impossible. I never say otherwise. Craig ascribes to
me a premise I do not hold, and which on my view is just false. In short,
Craig’s criticisms of my views seem to me to fail completely.
Red Herring?
Craig thinks that given my concern with divine ultimacy, my book’s main
brief should have been anti-Platonism, and that modal metaphysics was “a
red herring.”66 A Platonism of necessary abstract entities present independent of God is certainly incompatible with God’s being the sole ultimate
reality; if they exist independent of God, they are at least as ultimate in
the scheme of things as He. But suppose you want to avoid this. Platonic
views are rife in modal metaphysics. There are good reasons for this; necessary Platonic possible worlds, for instance, are tailored to the prevailing
sort of modal semantics and to many modal and metaphysical intuitions.
Modal metaphysics drives some to Platonism. Truly to avoid Platonism,
one has to show that it shouldn’t. This is one reason the modal truth
project isn’t a red herring. Modal truth is a door through which unsavory
beasts may enter, and the book tries to nail it shut by providing something more appealing than Platonism in its place. Pace Craig, it is surely
not the case that “once one has adopted divine psychologism [his name
for my view of abstract entities], one need not offer any modal theory at
all.”67 Theists concerned with divine ultimacy have to ward off threats by
way of modal metaphysics regardless. Ignoring them won’t make them
go away. You might, for instance, reject Platonism, find that you have no
adequate modal metaphysics to put in its place, and rescind your rejection. Further, Craig’s red-herring claim ignores possibilism, another sort
of view to which modal metaphysics might drive you even after you’ve
rejected Platonism. Possibilism and Platonism get roughly equal space in
my chapter on possible worlds. I discuss theist Platonism more than I do
66
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theist possibilism elsewhere in the book, but that is because it would be far
easier for my view to collapse into theist Platonism than into theist possibilism, and theist Platonism is popular while theist possibilism is not.
Possibilism comes in two varieties, Lewis’s of existent and Meinongians’ of non-existent objects. I show that theism can be conjoined with
existent-object possibilism. Contra Craig,68 my doing so doesn’t entail that
existent-object possibilism does not raise ultimacy concerns. Eternalist
uncreated concrete existent merely possible objects modo Lewis would be
as incompatible with sole divine ultimacy as eternalist uncreated concrete
existent actual objects. For Lewis, there is no language-independent distinction between the two sorts—the only reason our world isn’t “merely”
possible is that our purely-indexical word “actual” refers to it. So if the actual objects create a worry, the “merely” possible ones create the same one.
What I show entails only that those concerns can be met—by showing that
God can be the source of the full Lewis ontology, as I do.69 Turning to the
other sort of possibilism, Craig writes that
neo-Meinongianism does not raise the ultimacy concerns that motivate
Leftow’s project, since abstract objects do not exist on this view, making it a
sort of nominalism.70

To back this, Craig quotes against me a formulation of my ultimacy concerns on which they extend only to what exists, not to non-existents. The
formulation Craig quotes has direct Biblical motivation. Biblical writers
plainly did want to hold that no concrete existent was co-eternal with God
or exists independent of Him. Nothing in the Bible suggests that they had
Meinongian items in view, and as I was trying at that point to motivate
my project out of Scripture, that was the most I could say at that point. But
I also argue explicitly that theists simply shouldn’t be Meinongians. The
reason I give is that on Meinongian views, modal truth has an ontology of
non-existents, of which a God who can only cause existence can’t credibly
be the source, and that therefore modal truth itself remains independent
of God.71 That is, I bring up ultimacy concerns Meinongianism raises—the
threat that we can’t trace back appropriately to God items in the ontological census and obtaining states of affairs not due to created free agency
or created random action—suggest that theists couldn’t deal with them,
and infer that they should reject the view.
Further, Craig’s claim that on Meinongian views abstract objects don’t
exist is technically correct but a bit misleading. Non-existent possibilia
don’t exist, true. But they are part of the ontological census nonetheless. In
Meinongian systems a special quantifier and the absolutely unrestricted
universal quantifier range over them. Further, for Meinongians, they have
Ibid., 469n10.
GN, 107–112.
70
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Ibid., 43–44.
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properties even though they do not exist. Things with properties can be
sorted as abstract and concrete whether or not they exist. On standard
accounts of the abstract/concrete distinction, Meinongian objects count
as abstract: they are nowhere in spacetime, lack causal powers, etc.72 So
Meinongian views have a full panoply of abstracta, though they are not
versions of Platonism. (Platonic items exist.) On Meinongian views, the
abstracta include possible worlds. So Meinongian abstracta provide a full
non-theist modal ontology, and they would be a realm of which God is
not the source.
I argue that theists should hold that God is the source of all modal ontology, including abstracta if any.73 As Meinongian items count as abstract
and threaten to have a role in modal ontology, the very arguments I give
to motivate my approach to abstracta in modal ontology extend to them.74
So does the more general ultimacy concern that drives the book: that everything should trace back to God in the end. So I do not think a concern
with possibilism was misplaced in the book, or that modal metaphysics is
a red herring for theists with divine ultimacy on their minds. Of course, if
one rejects Platonism and possibilism, one is left with the question of what
modal ontology to put in their place. I argue that theists have distinctive
and attractive resources to answer that question.75
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They also “are” (in the Meinongian way) horses, cars, etc. They are at once abstract and
concrete, then: but Meinongians can avoid contradiction here with machinery they have in
their views for independent reasons, i.e., either their distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear properties (so Terence Parsons) or their distinction between two sorts of copula (e.g.,
Zalta’s distinction between that of exemplification and that of encoding).
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My thanks to Chris Tweedt for discussion. I’ve kept the text to responses to criticism. But
let me here just register puzzlement with two other bits of Craig’s review. He says in response
to my brief treatment of conventionalism that “conventionalism [holds] that there is no fact
of the matter concerning the existence of abstract objects” (469). The only conventionalism
I discuss is modal. Modal conventionalism makes no claim for or against the existence of
abstract objects, or about whether their existence is a matter of fact. It merely offers a theory
of the genesis of modal truth, which if true would eliminate one reason to posit abstracta. I’m
puzzled too at Craig’s statement that “a deflationary nominalism would avoid . . . ontological
commitment to . . . truths themselves . . . taking the truth predicate to be merely a device of
semantic ascent, a way of talking about a proposition P rather than asserting that P” (469).
If deflationary nominalists take themselves to be talking about propositions, they believe in
propositions, which if true are truths. On one point about conventionalism, though, Craig
has caught me out. He notes that I at one point call this a “no ontology” view and says that
it would be better classed as what I call a “safe ontology” view (470). He’s right—and in the
book’s only discussion of conventionalism, that is how I class it (GN, 67). A more charitable
critic might have noted this.

